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“Those People [May Yet Be] a Kind of
Solution” Late Imperial Thoughts on the
Humanization of Officialdom
DAVID A. WESTBROOK†
MARK MAGUIRE‡
I. INTRODUCTION
We are quite sympathetic to the thrust of this
Conference, and to John Braithwaite’s work over an
illustrious career. The legitimation of power, almost
invariably including a discussion of limitations and
temperance, is perhaps the heart of political philosophy. The
notion of division, of various sorts of power lodged in various
places, inhibiting each other and so tyranny, is central to our
understandings of the United States Constitution, with both
a capital and a lowercase “c.”1 Market integration, the

† Louis A. Del Cotto Professor and Co-Director, UB New York City Program on
Finance & Law, University at Buffalo, State University of New York. We would
like to thank Errol Meidinger and the Baldy Center for putting this conference
together. Christina Garsten, Rosa Lastra, and Joseph Westbrook helped at one
or another stage of the argument. The mistakes and other infelicities are our
responsibility.
‡ Senior Lecturer in Anthropology and Dean of Social Sciences, National
University of Ireland at Maynooth.
1. The locus classicus is the Federalist Papers. See also Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, Constitutions and Culture Studies, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 133 passim
(1990).
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European project, and globalization can, perhaps only can,
be legitimated in terms of the interpenetration of powers,
namely, the destruction of national congruencies among
peoples, ideologies, governments, industrial capacity, and
military capability most perfectly expressed by Nazi
Germany, albeit at the cost of alienation that we are now
seeing expressed in the United States, Germany, and
jarringly, Sweden, the Shangri La of United States left
liberal politics. Arriving at the contemporary, we see leaders
around the world whose reach must be limited for the sake
of many. So it is not that power and its limitation, especially
through complex structures and more amorphous
assemblages, do not pose profound and vital questions.
The invitation to this Conference, however, asked us to
address this topic in relation to our current scholarship. In
our work over the last decade or more, a less familiar view of
“power” is emerging from the mists of social inquiry. We
might begin by recalling Hannah Arendt’s distinction
between power, understood by those subject to it to be
authoritative because believed to be legitimate, and violence,
which subjects merely suffer.2 Rather than assuming the
existence of power and concerning ourselves with
mechanisms for its temperance, we have been studying
power as expressed in various “present situations” by
officials whose offices are believed to be more or less
legitimate if hardly infallible. If this depiction fairly portrays
some important aspects of our world, then a different posture
for the academic would seem to be in order, at least in some
circumstances. But we are getting ahead of the argument.
We started and are still working together in the context
of “Global Foresight,” a multiyear, multinational and
multidisciplinary project directed by Christina Garsten,
Professor of Social Anthropology at Stockholm University
2. HANNAH ARENDT, On Violence, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 83 passim
(1972). Arendt distinguishes power (recognized by tradition and common consent)
from violence (born of political illegitimacy). Thanks to Joseph A. Westbrook for
the clarification.
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and Principal at Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies.
The Program is funded by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond,
The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social
Sciences, perhaps best known for establishing the “Nobel” in
Economics.3 The Jubileumsfond was itself established by the
Riksbank, Sweden’s central bank, which happens to be the
oldest such bank in the world.
In
diverse
settings
increasingly
studied
by
ethnographers, plausible (and desirable or objectionable)
futures are brought into the present by being mapped or
otherwise represented. The combination of abstraction and
plausibility tacitly implies an ethos of representation—the
scenario is often assumed to be a fair articulation of a specific
future state. But the future made present is also
performative and in that sense, subjective. And as the future
is studied, as work is done today to attain or avoid some
future, collectivities are constituted. The image is of a map
tending towards a blueprint, script, or even choreography,
meant to be accurate even if also subjective, a participatory
description. We speak of “anticipatory knowledge,” of things
that organizations come to know about that which,
somewhat bewilderingly, has yet to come to be. The future is
thus made tractable, or at least made to appear to be
tractable, in important present situations such the Bank of
England,4 Google,5 the Norwegian Government Pension

3. Technically, “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel,” was established in 1968, long after the death of Alfred
Nobel, who established the Nobel prizes via his will. The first prizes were
awarded in 1901, on the first anniversary of Nobel’s death.
4. DOUGLAS R. HOLMES, ECONOMY OF WORDS: COMMUNICATIVE IMPERATIVES IN
CENTRAL BANKS passim (2014).
5. Mikkel Flyverbom & John Murray, Datastructuring—Organizing and
Curating Digital Traces into Action, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, JULY-DEC. 2018, at 1.
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Fund Global,6 the World Economic Forum (“Davos”),7 and
others. Professor Maguire’s ethnographic research focuses on
airport security comprising a host of institutions, from local
police to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. From these
and other conversations (Professor Westbrook is active in
several fields), much more nuanced understandings of how
officials think in time, and hence official power itself, emerge.
A word of caution: the various projects within Global
Foresight do not constitute anything like a “map” of power in
today’s world, but they do form important islands in what
might be imagined as the archipelago of modernity. It is a bit
quick to claim that by looking at how the future is confronted
by our officials, we can glimpse, out of the corner of our eyes
as it were, what it means to be “modern” now—but
something along those lines.8
II. A FEW ASPECTS OF OFFICIALDOM
A few themes or general fields have emerged from
analysis and discussion across the various sites comprised by
Global Foresight. What follows is a sketch of some key
aspects of ways in which official power, power over modern
life, is both quantitatively less and qualitatively different
6. Knut Christian Myhre and Douglas R. Holmes, among other scholars, are
currently conducting research that examines the management of the Norwegian
Government Pension Fund Global. The project “explores how ethical forms shape
finance to create new iterations of the economy, and how financial forms entail
ethical concerns.” The project is funded by the Research Council of Norway. UNIV.
OF OSLO MUSEUM OF CULTURAL HISTORY, FORMS OF ETHICS, SHAPES OF FINANCE:
ETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATIONS OF THE LIMITS OF CONTEMPORARY CAPITAL,
https://www.khm.uio.no/english/research/projects/forms-of-etics/index.html (last
visited June 2, 2019).
7. CHRISTINA GARSTEN & ADRIENNE SÖRBOM, DISCREET POWER: HOW
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM SHAPES MARKET AGENDAS passim (2018).

THE

8. It is worth noting here—even in a footnote—that there are moves to
recognize the limits of what ethnography can reasonably say (represent), and
efforts to refunction ethnography so that it can legitimately say more. Some of
our discussions are around how ethnography can be more than words: we want
to get mixed up in the contemporary and consider roles that go beyond the
representational.
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from what is often assumed. Again, this is not an exhaustive
list much less a logical demonstration of some “necessary”
aspects of contemporary bureaucracies.
A. Knowledgeable Uncertainty
In contemporary data-rich domains, information
(sometimes boggling amounts of information) often coexists
with significant uncertainty. While uncertainty may be part
of the human condition, consciousness of uncertainty is
hardly constant. In hindsight, the end of the twentieth
century was marked by an astonishing level of confidence.
Experts knew what they knew. Catch phrases, “the end of
history,” “the Washington Consensus,” and “the Great
Moderation” express the spirit of the age that has passed.
The attacks of September 11th and any number of computer
hacks made us aware of insecurity in new ways. (The United
States Department of Defense began funding efforts to
develop a “science of security”). The emergence of unlooked
for political developments like the Arab Spring and the
insolvency of Greece and Brexit, to say nothing of the election
of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States,
made experts look foolish in real time. And most importantly,
the Global Financial Crisis cast entire disciplines and core
systems into doubt. Almost a full generation after September
11th, experts speak more hesitantly. They know that their
conceptual frameworks are compromised, but they are not
sure how, or to what extent. New paradigms are in short
supply.
And yet we have more information than ever before:
more capacity to surveil, collect, and process data, capacities
which themselves raise problems. In such contexts, a host of
conceptual and expressive tools are deployed to make sense
of the world and act upon it: narratives and models, scenarios
and exercises. Much of the research in Global Foresight
concerns the range of tools, and what tools teach their users.
Too often social scientists have assumed that such tools
are either faulty or are followed slavishly—social scientists
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have tended to ask after the validity of the outputs. Validity
is of course important, but bureaucratic expertise is a
practice before and after it is a substantive proposition to be
falsified or not. So in an age of uncertainty, another truth has
emerged: the map may be necessary even if it is to some
substantial but unknown degree wrong. The expert must
continue to navigate. Failures of security—being caught by
surprise—do not lead to admissions of error, but lead instead
to more security, starting with measures designed to prevent
the last failure (“closing the barn door after the horse
escapes”).
For example, the complete failure of ratings agencies to
warn about the risks embedded in the financial products that
triggered the Global Financial Crisis has not led to the
collapse of those agencies, much less the abandonment of
credit rating as a practice. For reasons beyond the scope of
this paper, credit rating is necessary to the custodial
practices of social capitalism, and that function will be
fulfilled. The truth of a given credit rating, or likely to be
produced by a given methodology, are distinct questions from
the institutional necessity of the practice. One may say
similar things about the London Inter-bank Offered Rate.
More generally, thinking in this hesitant age is often
conducted with a view to conceptual horizons that seem
difficult, if not impossible to define. The most obvious such
horizon is “security,” a word that emerges in field after field,
not as quite the same word, but with the same problem: while
insecurity is obvious in the event, whether or not something
is secure—really secure?—cannot be known. Similarly, while
there is an agreed upon definition of monetary stability (2%
inflation in the consumer price index), there is no such
consensus definition of financial stability. Experts know that
they do not know as much as they used to think they did, but
must proceed nonetheless.
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B. Conflicted Domains, Limited Agency, Resource
Allocation
How do the relatively senior figures in which we are
primarily interested locate their authority and specify their
jurisdictions within a common contemporary, albeit one that
is fractured or separated into “silos”?9 How do they organize
their activity vis-à-vis other institutions; what relations do
they have to manage? Who are the clients, consumers, or
competitors? To whom do they ultimately answer? An old
Army joke is illustrative: a bright young captain is giving a
briefing about recent actions and presumed intentions of “the
enemy.” A colonel curtly reminds him: “the Vietnamese are
the adversary. The Air Force is the enemy.” (Services may be
changed to fit the speaker’s service). Or, to put the matter in
most familiar terms: how much of the work of the university
is neither research, nor teaching, nor even “service”
(whatever that might be felt to be), but struggles for
advancement within the university itself?
Consequently, the scope of official agency is often quite
narrow in practice, much more narrow than implied by words
like “state,” “government,” or even “law.” Such words are
abstract, unspecified, and hence unconstrained, implying
freedom of action. Actual officials, however, are specified in
countless ways, hemmed in, their options limited. Actual
officials never see the freedom promised by the abstract
“state.” As further discussed below, officials often have little
capacity to do much besides what they already do, which may
or may not be the right thing.
In order to keep doing what they are doing at all, officials
generally must struggle for resources. Many of the activities
in which we are interested do not, in themselves, make
money or otherwise generate resources. A compliance
9. It is worth noting the number of societal domains in the so-called western
world, and beyond, where institutions complain of “silos,” “walled gardens,”
“stove pipes,” etc. See GILLIAN TETT, THE SILO EFFECT: THE PERIL OF EXPERTISE
AND THE PROMISE OF BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS passim (2015).
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program is a cost center. Airport security is expensive,
bothersome, and by its nature raises concerns about privacy,
discrimination, and an overweening state. It is only when
things go wrong that a well drafted legal document, or a
weapons system, or a well-designed airport, proves that the
cost was worth it. Until such failures, the erosion of the
institution’s justification and hence its funding is the order
of the day. During a bull market, an understaffed United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) could,
and did, ignore whistleblowers, and Bernie Madoff would
operate a complex Ponzi scheme for years and years.
C. The Public
“The public” is neither neutral nor trivial nor often
clearly specified. How do officials imagine their public or
audience in terms of representation, the justification given
to license actions or resource allocations, or to legitimate
actions that may result in risk or failure? For whom are the
experts expert? What counts as success or failure? And how
does the success of the enterprise affect the future of an office
or the trajectory of a career—how is the official rewarded (or
punished) and how are such actions publicly legitimated?
Such questions are familiar, even traditional, in the
context of corporate governance. The same questions take on
added urgency in security contexts, when lives are often at
stake and the usual mechanisms of transparency and
accountability may not be available.
D. The Weight of History
Like so much work in the social sciences, Global
Foresight asks after the public interest. (The project must
present itself as in the service of the public, or it could not be
publicly funded). “What is the public interest” reads in the
present tense, but not only is the future in many of the
settings that we study not only not new, it is on the contrary
quite often old, and consequently constrained.
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For dramatic example, the United States war in
Afghanistan is now the nation’s longest running campaign.
The “Forever War” has become not something transitory (to
be won and so ended), but the norm, the context of business.
How is the future of the war envisioned? What is the nation
trying to accomplish? What is our preferred scenario? During
the heyday of the neocons there was talk of nation building,
optimistic at the time and simply no longer credible. “Getting
Bin Laden” provided a purpose, if a grisly one, but he was
finally killed. Political speeches continue to rely on
abstractions—security, protecting freedom, etc.—but they do
not suffice to explain this policy not that. “Get the job done.”
But what is the job? So President Trump ran on getting out
of Afghanistan; he later supported sending another 4,000
troops. But why not zero? Or 14,000? Or 24,000?10
What might a reason to continue our efforts in
Afghanistan look like? It might be argued that the United
States needs to be in Afghanistan, even at the cost of running
a low voltage unwinnable war, because it gives us a heavy
physical presence in South Central Asia. Perhaps, in their
time in the same place, that is what the British believed.
Afghanistan, in this view, is not a strategic objective, the
graveyard of empires, so much as a tactical cost in the great
game. This argument has not been made officially; it is not a
public justification. Fighting a war in order to be able to
threaten your neighbors is hardly a politically correct
argument. At least in theory, however, one could imagine
relatively principled geo-strategic reasons for the Untied
States to maintain its presence in Afghanistan. Somebody in
authority, however, needs to own this rationale, or own
something like it, so that competing public expenditures, in
the service of other policies, even other security policies—

10. Perhaps there should be an acknowledgment of single-variable theory,
such as opium production. See, e.g., Alfred W. McCoy, How the Heroin Trade
Explains the US-UK Failure in Afghanistan, GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/09/how-the-heroin-trade-explainsthe-us-uk-failure-in-afghanistan.
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troops versus carriers versus diplomats versus less versus
more—may be judged. Pettifoggery, “an equilibrium tilted in
our favor,” whatever that means, as commanding General
John Nicholson said, simply does not suffice.
So a substantial part of the United States security
community, spending nearly 5% of the gross domestic
product of the world’s largest economy, operates without an
articulated future, in some real sense without a strategy.
Strategy is subsumed by tactics. Or, to be more precise, the
future looks like the status quo, a continuation of what we’ve
been doing, only maybe more (or less!) so. Getting the job
done, even if the job is not specified.
As suggested already, there are profound organizational
and institutional constraints on what can be seriously
thought or said, or not. Scenarios are formed by people in
institutions, and the institutions import form, telos,
commitments, and a host of assumptions surprisingly
independent of the world ostensibly mapped. The United
States military provides security through the capacity to
project force globally, making it difficult to ask what the
purpose of United States engagement in Afghanistan is, and
therefore making it impossible, at least under ordinary
circumstances, to judge success or failure. Success or failure
at what? Security, presumably—the conceptual horizon
recedes. From the Pentagon’s perspective, “militarized global
hegemony” is deeply synonymous with security. So nobody in
the room has the authority to say, well, why don’t we devote
substantial resources to thinking about doing something
else? People who say things like that do not get in the room.11
The institutional drive towards reiteration is not just a
military matter. Could Google seriously entertain the idea of
not digitizing things? Each university, under the banner of
11. See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, DEPLOYING OURSELVES: ISLAMIST VIOLENCE AND
And, if you are in the
room, only certain things are thinkable and sayable. See IRVING L. JANIS,
GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES passim
(1982).
THE RESPONSIBLE PROJECTION OF U.S. FORCE passim (2011).
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“innovation,” does exactly what every other research
university
does,
monetizing
inventions,
adding
administrators. To generalize, in many powerful settings,
consensus is often profoundly sociologically and
professionally constrained. The social horizon is far shorter
than the intellectual horizon.12 Institutions do what they do
until they are forced to do something else, or, in Darwinian
fashion, they are replaced.
Thus, our inquiries are leading us from the future to the
past, from power to constraint.
III. “THOSE PEOPLE WERE A KIND OF SOLUTION”13
Phrasing the problem of politics at the present time to be
“tempering power” answers as many questions as it asks.
Among other things, the phrase posits a holder of power, a
sovereign with (im)moral agency, in our circles often called
“neoliberalism.” In this imaginary, the role of the academic
(especially the progressive and engaged academic, as all
academics must be) is to speak truth to power. Since our
audiences tend to be small, it is good to ensure that we have
somebody to address, and indeed a part to play. Through
Global Foresight and otherwise, we are trying to envision
other ways for the social sciences to engage political, and
especially expert, bureaucratic, exercises of power.
Until such time, however, social science imaginaries of
power may be expected to continue employing traditional
corporal metaphors: power dwells inside the body of the
sovereign (state, corporation, military, unions). Power is thus
12. In Plato’s The Republic and indeed, Plato’s life, the political imagination
always outstrips actual political possibility. It is why Plato says the greatest
obstacle to realizing the Republic is the fact that the Philosopher doesn’t want to
be King (and when he strays, as Plato himself did, he fails). It’s worth noting that
Thomas Jefferson didn’t like Plato—at bottom, Plato is demarking the limitation
of Enlightened politics (Plato is right, Jefferson is wrong).
13. C.P. CAVAFY, Waiting for the Barbarians, in C.P. CAVAFY COLLECTED
POEMS 18, 19 (George Savidis ed., Edmund Keeley & Philip Sherrard trans., rev.
ed. 1992).
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imagined to reside in occluded spaces that are accessible only
by “studying up”14 or journeying into “the belly of the
beast.”15 Consequently, opportunities for ethnographic
collaboration often succumb to demands for critical exposé,
speaking truth to power from outside.
This may be changing. Recent anthropologies of
expertize have contributed to expanding such imaginaries
showing myriad sites where experts work (sometimes
creatively, sometimes destructively) to anticipate uncertain
futures or advance a particular version of society or the social
“good.”16 Instead of power congealed, ethnographies show
problem-spaces characterized by, inter alia, thin resources
and limited options, and yet a desire for thick collaboration.
As examples, in central banks, one finds alreadyethnographic
experimentation
with
language
and
17
behavior, and the ever-expanding domain of “security” is
home to “bleeding edge” experimentation that targets life
itself.18
As such collaborations have matured, the voices of those
important figures can be foregrounded and opened for
analysis. This is much of what Global Foresight is currently
attempting to do. Methodologically and pedagogically, we
14. Laura Nader, Up the Anthropologist—Perspectives Gained from Studying
Up, in REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY 284, 284–311 (Dell Hymes ed., 1972).
15. Loïc Wacquant, The Curious Eclipse of Prison Ethnography in the Age of
Mass Incarceration, 3 ETHNOGRAPHY 371, 371–97 (2002).
16. See, e.g., GARSTEN & SÖRBOM, supra note 7 passim; Dominic Boyer,
Thinking Through the Anthropology of Experts, 15 ANTHROPOLGY IN ACTION 38,
38–46 (2008); Kim Fortun, Ethnography in Late Industrialism, 27 CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 446, 446–64 (2012); Douglas R. Holmes & George E. Marcus,
Cultures of Expertise and the Management of Globalization: Toward the ReFunctioning of Ethnography, in GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS,
AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 235, 235–52 (Aihwa Ong & Stephen
J. Collier eds., 2005).
17. See HOLMES, supra note 4 passim.
18. Mark Maguire, Counter-terrorism in European Airports, in THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FRONTLINE OF POLICING,
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND BORDER CONTROL 110, 110–43 (Mark Maguire et al.
eds., 2014).
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now have an opportunity to pay attention to the modes
through which ethnographers can engage senior managers,
institutional leaders, and other powerful people, people who
have the capacity to shape their domains and so our own
contexts.
At least in lots of situations that matter (by no means all
situations), the task does not seem to be speaking “truth”
(understood as something to which the scholar has exclusive
access) to “power” (understood as a morally immature yet
immensely capable sovereign, an impetuous Princeling). For
much of political life, the better and harder inquiries concern
what might be imagined and how might such things get done,
with what consequences? The scholar has the great
advantage of operating at a certain remove. Her job is not at
stake in the domains she studies; she can afford to listen and
can speak with relative credibility. And so things might
begin to make sense. In short, what is needed from the
academy is sensitive critique and an eye for possibility. That
is, the relatively amateurish position of the ethnographer
provides the opportunity for a public (as opposed to
professional) view, and just maybe, a public accounting.
Global Foresight prompts us to consider Weber, and our
notions of bureaucracy more generally, in a bunch of
interesting and perhaps revisionist ways. Bureaucratic
“rationality,” the “iron cage” of modernity, and even “politics
as vocation”—warhorses of the sociological imagination—
now seem insufficiently nuanced, at least as such terms are
usually used in the academy.
IV. CONCLUSION: A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY
Much contemporary governance is actually done through
decidedly undemocratic bureaucracies, what we might
collectively call the administrative state. In this regard, at
least, the liberal democratic order is much like the old Soviet
order, whatever it is Russia has now, or China, or even a
large corporation or university—actual governance is
bureaucratic.
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It is true that in liberal democracies, administration is
legitimated
by
reference
to . . . liberal
democracy.
Representatives are elected by “We the People,” more or less,
and those representatives delegate power to administrative
agencies and bureaucracies. This, at any rate, is the story we
tell in any number of regulatory law classes in the United
States. What the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, or the SEC, or any agency does is presumptively
legitimate because it is done by bureaucratic officials hired—
or their bosses were hired—by people who were elected by
the people, or who were nominated and approved by people
who were elected by the people.
For present purposes, the point is that “liberal
democracy” is not the mechanism of governance, it is the
mechanism of, at most, distant oversight over the
bureaucracies that actually wield power, and the mechanism
of legitimation for such bureaucracies. Note that a similar
dynamic plays across the European project —whatever the
Commission does is said to be democratic because of the
democratic process in the Member States. It need hardly be
said that such legitimacy is thin, believed by few.
Harold Berman argued that the twentieth century
“social” revolutions, especially the Russian Revolution,
experienced in the United States in attenuated form as the
New Deal, gave rise to a new understanding of the state. In
this understanding, the state is directly responsible for civil
society writ large—health and welfare and such. This vast
expansion of the role of the state required a concomitant
expansion of the apparatus of the state—the growth of the
modern bureaucracy. This can be seen architecturally, in
Washington D.C., if one heads northwest from the White
House, in the rows of fine apartments built for civil servants
in the 1930s and 1940s out Connecticut Avenue. One might
also tell a parallel story about the rise of the giant modern
corporation.
The changes wrought by the English, American, and
French Revolutions—and a great deal of civil life and law in
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between—carried with them their own legitimacy. These
revolutions made the set of ideas for which “liberal
democracy” is a shorthand, a kind of presumptively
legitimate armature or model of governance. A judiciary
ought to be independent, a legislature democratically
elected, and so forth and so on. Such understandings have
become part of the collective unconscious, at least in many
societies.
The twentieth century social revolutions that ushered in
the modern administrative state, however, were not as
successful as a matter of culture and collective psychology.
In particular, the social revolutions were not very successful
in legitimating the administrative state. Although it came to
be widely understood that the government should be
responsible for education, health care, and social rights
generally, the social revolution left us with little normative
ordering of bureaucratic governance along the lines of the
legitimating tales told for liberal democracy. Bureaucracy
was and is generally seen as alienating, Kafkaesque. Weber
speaks of disenchantment. Russians have endless jokes.
Populists decry distant elites. Discourse gets rougher;
violence may break out.19
Even within the capitals, bureaucracy is almost always
legitimated not on its own terms, but instead by reference to
liberal democracy, the achievements of the earlier
19. There is one other feature here, which is the lack of specificity with which
people use the state (and increasingly “governmentality”) to signal some
nefarious power-configuration that cannot be tamed—it puts the systemic into
social life. In part, Michel Foucault is to blame, but he recognized it at least:
As soon as we accept the existance of [a] continuity or genetic kinship
between different forms of the state, and as soon as we attribute a
constant evolutionary dynamism to the state, it then becomes possible
not only to use different analyses to support each other, but also to refer
them back to each other and so deprive them of their specificity. For
example, an analysis of social security and the administrative apparatus
on which it rests ends up, via some slippages and thanks to some plays
on words, referring us to the analysis of concentration camps.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE
FRANCE, 1978–79 187–88 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2008).
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revolutions. In particular, legislatures are said to “delegate”
specific regulations and other decisions to administrative
agencies. The exercise of power is legitimate because
decided—in the abstract and not in detail—by the duly
elected representatives of the people. The legitimacy of
bureaucracy is thus derivative, even parasitic.
If elections are seen to be less than genuine, as they
sometimes are, and as the distance between election and
bureaucracy grows, as it seemingly inevitably does, the idea
that bureaucratic power is either democratic or liberal
becomes harder and harder to sustain. Thus “government,”
“elites,” “Europe,” and so forth are easily cast as the enemy
of democracy, indeed the enemy of the people.
In other words, the “crisis of liberal democracy” is largely
a crisis for the administrative contemporary state,
understood operationally in bureaucratic terms. For a long
time, states, that is, bureaucracies, could use stories about
“liberal democracy” to legitimate themselves. In many
societies and for many people, such stories no longer seem
convincing. Instead, bureaucracies are seen to be selfperpetuating expressions of elite power.
What is to be done about this situation? One answer,
beloved by liberals, is to “try, try again,” that is, to make
bureaucracy more directly subject to liberal democracy.
Require more transparency. Limit the discretion of officials.
Subject administrative action to legal review. There is much
to recommend this approach, which is basically the approach
of administrative law in the United States, but it has its
limits. Judicial review, transparency, and limitations all
tend to produce more bureaucracy, more of the same
complexities, delays, and inscrutable exercises of power that
were the source of frustration in the first place.
The opposite approach, ostensibly beloved by many
conservatives, is to do away with bureaucracy whenever
possible. Shrink government! Again, there are times when
this makes sense, but the limitations are equally obvious.
Bureaucratic government—or bureaucratic institutions,
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whether deemed public or private—are often required to
make life possible in complex societies, indeed constitute
complex societies.
Rather than thinking about bureaucratic legitimacy in
derivative terms, perhaps bureaucracy could be at least
partially legitimated by directly addressing the central
philosophical problem of liberalism itself, the absence of a
shared notion of the good.
Like other critics of liberalism, Alisdair MacIntyre
argued that modern political and legal thought moves from
substantive commitments to particular ideals of the good
towards procedural commitments, and perhaps to purely
formal goods, such as equality, defined in terms of such
procedures. This abandonment of notions of the good and
settling on procedure, preeminently contract, in fact, is what
makes the writings of Hobbes, or the Peace of Westphalia,
“modern” rather than medieval achievements. If the wars of
religion cannot be solved by disputation or on the battlefield,
perhaps we can agree to disagree.
But, as MacIntyre delineates in After Virtue, such peace
comes at a great price.20 There are things that cannot be
thought or discussed without some shared notion of the goods
appropriate to different things, and ultimately important to
human fruition. That is, ideas of whether this or that is
better for some X presumes a knowledge of what X, ideally,
should be. A telos is an end in terms of which a thing may be
understood, a watch in terms of keeping time. The watch
may also be jewelry or a paperweight, but it is “timekeeper”
that defines the watch as watch. This is teleology, Aristotle
through Aquinas. It is classical and medieval, but by
definition not modern thought.
So one way to understand bureaucratic delegation is that
it implicitly creates spaces in which such thinking or such
conversations can happen today, that is, spaces for
20. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTURE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY passim
(3d ed. 2007).
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teleological discourse within a frame of liberal democracy
that explicitly denies the possibility, much less achievement
of such discourse. For example, a legislature may decide that
“it would be good if” we had clean water, or secure borders,
or stable financial markets, or what have you, and then—in
an organic statute such as the Securities Exchange Act of
1934—creates an institution devoted to such ends.
In this view, bureaucracy is not illiberal merely because
of its distance from liberal processes and its employment of
elites. Bureaucracy is illiberal in intention and in principle—
it is the way liberal societies manage to have teleological
political discourse. The problem—especially for diverse
polities like the United States, or Europe, and perhaps less
obviously, Russia or China—is that teleological discourse,
agreement on the good, is hard to come by. People think
differently about such things. So vague abstract standards
suffice to authorize a regulatory agency, but must be ever
half-articulated, somewhat disingenuous.
Telos is associated with the stake towards which Greek
footraces were run—out to the stake, around it, and back to
the start line. So the idea of “telos” has not only purpose—
run fast—but a temporality built into it. The stake is a goal,
the thing to be reached, the not yet achieved. The future. So,
with only a little violence, we might understand teleology in
terms not of purpose secured by consensus on the nature of
the good, but in terms of preferred futures.
At this point it is no more than a vague hope, but our
idea is that Global Foresight and similar scholarly efforts can
help people understand bureaucracies as places where
different futures are collectively thought and worked upon,
places of—at least on good days—good faith and team effort,
with a good will. Rather than Hobbes’ Leviathan, or Weber’s
rationalist disenchantment and petty power politics, we
might think of bureaucracy as public service towards some,
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still to be articulated, notion of the collective good.21
Bureaucracy humanely conceived could thus compliment
and buttress those forms of government that we, somewhat
misleadingly, now call liberal democracy.

21. More abstractly, human and collective efforts to articulate futures, to
avoid or ameliorate dangers and enjoy possibilities, can at least partially stand
in for the religiously grounded notions of “the good” that liberalism has
unsuccessfully tried to do without.

